The medial prefrontal cortex exhibits money illusion by Weber, Bernd et al.
The medial prefrontal cortex exhibits money illusion
Bernd Webera, Antonio Rangelb, Matthias Wibralc, and Armin Falkc,1
aDepartment of Epileptology and Department of NeuroCognition, Life and Brain Center, University of Bonn, Sigmund-Freud-Strasse 25, 53127 Bonn,
Germany; bDivision of the Humanities and Social Sciences and Computation and Neural Systems, California Institute of Technology, 1200 East California
Boulevard, Mail Code 136-93, Pasadena, CA 91125; and cDepartment of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Communicated by George A. Akerlof, University of California, Berkeley, CA, February 12, 2009 (received for review December 3, 2008)
Behavioral economists have proposed that money illusion, which
is a deviation from rationality in which individuals engage in
nominal evaluation, can explain a wide range of important eco-
nomic and social phenomena. This proposition stands in sharp
contrast to the standard economic assumption of rationality that
requires individuals to judge the value of money only on the basis
of the bundle of goods that it can buy—its real value—and not on
the basis of the actual amount of currency—its nominal value. We
used fMRI to investigate whether the brain’s reward circuitry
exhibits money illusion. Subjects received prizes in 2 different
experimental conditions thatwere identical in real economic terms,
but differed in nominal terms. Thus, in the absence of money
illusion there should be no differences in activation in reward-
related brain areas. In contrast, we found that areas of the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which have been previ-
ously associated with the processing of anticipatory and experi-
enced rewards, and the valuation of goods, exhibited money
illusion. We also found that the amount of money illusion exhib-
ited by the vmPFC was correlated with the amount of money
illusion exhibited in the evaluation of economic transactions.
neuroeconomics  ventromedial prefrontal cortex
Intuitively, money illusion implies that an increase in income isvalued positively, even when prices go up by the same amount,
leaving real purchasing power unchanged (1). In this sense
money illusion has been interpreted ‘‘as a bias in the assessment
of the real value of economic transactions, induced by a nominal
evaluation’’ (2). Economists have traditionally been skeptical
about the notion of money illusion (3), but recent behavioral
evidence has challenged this view (2, 4–6). For example, when
asked to rate the happiness of 2 otherwise identical persons who
received either a 2% wage increase without inflation or a 5%
wage increase with 4% inflation, the majority of subjects at-
tribute happiness on the basis of greater nominal raises, despite
lower real raises (2). A limitation of these studies, however, is
that the researchers could not directly observe the cognitive
processes that give rise to money illusion and were able to infer
only indirectly its presence from its effects on behavior. As a
consequence, much of the evidence that has been put forward in
favor of money illusion is also consistent with alternative rational
explanations (1).
In this study we sidestep this problem by using functional
magnetic resonance imagaing (fMRI) to test the hypothesis that
parts of the brain’s reward evaluation circuitry, which are known
to play a critical role in decision making and learning, exhibit
money illusion. To do so we compared blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) activity in response to earned incomes that
differed in nominal terms, but that were identical in real terms.
In the experiment, 24 subjects earned money in a simple
estimation task (Fig. 1). At the end of the experiment subjects
spent their income purchasing goods displayed in catalogs. There
were 2 conditions: In the high-price condition incomes and
catalog prices were 50% higher than in the second, low-price
condition. Except for the different prices the catalogs were
completely identical in both conditions. Thus, real purchasing
power was identical in the low- and the high-price conditions, but
nominal incomes differed by 50%. Conditions alternated every
5 trials and subjects always knew which condition they were in.
Furthermore, subjects were extensively familiarized with the
prices at which they could purchase goods in both the high- and
the low-price conditions before the fMRI task (see Methods
below for details).
Our main hypothesis was that areas of the brain that are
engaged in the experiencing of rewards (7–9), such as the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), would exhibit money
illusion in the sense of exhibiting a stronger BOLD response for
incomes that were higher in nominal terms, but had an identical
real value. Activity in these brain regions has been shown to be
modulated by the receipt of both primary rewards such as food
delivery (10) and more abstract forms of rewards like monetary
incentives (9, 11, 12). Recent neuroimaging studies have also
shown that the vmPFC is involved in the valuation of goods at
the time of decision making (13–15).
Subjects solved the estimation task correctly in 92.94% (SD
0.06) of the trials in the high-price condition and in 92.33%
(SD 0.06) of the trials in the low-price condition. Performance
between both conditions did not differ significantly (P  0.682).
Mean incomes earned (in real values) during the high- and
low-price conditions were €75.46 (SD 1.32) and €75.32 (SD
1.34), respectively (P  0.645).
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the experimental design. Subjects were informed
whether they were in the high- or the low-price condition for the next block
of 5 trials. Subjects then saw a number of blue dots for 1.5 s. A number was
then presented and subjects had to decide within 1.5 s whether the number
of dots on thefirst screenhadbeen loweror higher. After a response feedback
and a short delay, an income screen informed subjects about their monetary
reward for the trial.
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A contrast of BOLD responses between the high- and the
low-price conditions at the time of the income feedback showed
significantly increased activity within the vmPFC (12/47/0; P 
0.001 uncorrected; 10-voxel extent threshold) (Fig. 2A; see
Methods for details) during the high-price trials. Furthermore, as
Fig. 2B shows, vmPFC activation increased with income in both
conditions, but was always higher in the high-price compared to
the low-price condition for given positive real incomes (joint
paired t test, P  0.05). This result means that reward activation
generally increased with income (16), but was significantly
higher in situations where nominal incomes and prices were both
50% higher, which supports the hypothesis that activity in the
vmPFC is subject to money illusion.
Additional support for the economic significance of our
findings comes from a postexperimental questionnaire based on
Shafir et al. (2). We asked subjects to rate the economic
advantageousness of a series of economic situations in which a
person bought a house and sold it 1 year later. Similar to our
experimental setup there was a high-price and a low-price
version for each level of real change. For example, the house
could be sold for 23% above buying price when inflation was
25% (high) or for 1% below when inflation was 1% (low), both
implying a real loss of 2%. We constructed a measure of money
illusion on the basis of whether subjects rated the first situation
as more advantageous than the second. This measure was highly
correlated with the activation difference in the vmPFC (Spear-
man’s r 0.60, P 0.01) [Fig. 2C; for further results concerning
the potential interaction between money illusion and loss aver-
sion see supporting information (SI) Table S1], suggesting that
the amount of money illusion in the vmPFC might affect
economic evaluations in a systematic way.
The findings in this paper suggest that money illusion is real
in the sense that the level of reward-related brain activity in the
vmPFC in response to monetary prizes increases with nominal
changes that have no consequence for subjects’ real purchasing
power. The importance of this finding derives from the fact that
the answer to many classic economic problems depends on
whether money illusion exists. For example, money illusion has
been put forward as an explanation for the nonneutrality of
money, which implies that central banks can affect production,
investment, and consumption through changes in monetary
policy that have an impact on the inflation rate. Likewise it offers
an explanation for the important phenomenon that wages and
prices are often downwardly rigid, a leading explanation for
involuntary unemployment (17, 18). It is also a potential cause
of bubbles in important markets, such as the housing market
(19), and of deviations of stock prices from their fundamental
values (20, 21). At the firm level, money illusion is important to
determine optimal wage policies, which depend much on
whether workers care about nominal or real wages (22). Finally,
the existence of money illusion is important for the understand-
ing of the relation between income, inflation, and subjective
well-being (23). Importantly, even small amounts of money
illusion can have substantial effects: This impact is nicely dem-
onstrated in a series of laboratory experiments, showing that
small deviations from rationality imply big and lasting effects in
aggregate outcomes (4, 24). The results of the current experi-
ment are complementary to these behavioral studies. Although
the latter show that pure nominal changes can lead to behavioral
responses, they had to assume that money illusion was indeed
induced by the experimental manipulation. In contrast, the
current experiment does not lead to behavioral changes, but
instead provides a more direct neurophysiological account for
the existence of money illusion. The combination of findings
from both approaches provides a strong case for the importance
of money illusion.
Methods
Subjects. Twenty-four subjects (SD  3 years, range 21–32 years) without any
history of neurological or psychiatric disease participated in the study. Two
subjects had to be excluded from the analysis because of scanner dysfunction
and 4 because of excessive head movement. All subjects were right-handed
according to the Edinburgh Handedness Scale and gave written informed
consent before the study.
Task. Subjects performed 200 trials of a simple work task described in Fig. 1.
The task involved estimating the number of dots on a screen. At the end of
each trial, subjects received feedback about their performanceand income for
the trial. Incorrect guesses always led to an income of zero and correct ones to
a positive income.
The critical idea of the experiment was to create 2 conditions, which were
identical in real income terms, but that differed in their nominal representa-
Fig. 2. Results fromthe fMRI experiment. (A) The vmPFCexhibiteda stronger
BOLD response to income feedback in the high-price than in the low-price
condition (12/47/0; P 0.001uncorrected; 10-voxel-extent threshold). (B) Beta
estimates for the vmPFC at income feedback for different real income bins
during high- and low-price conditions. Joint paired t test for real vs. nominal
incomes. P 0.05. (C) Cross-subject correlation between a neural measure of
money illusion (given by the difference in vmPFC activation at income feed-
back between the high- and the low-price conditions) and a questionnaire
measure of money illusion (given by responses to hypothetical economic
transactions involving house purchases). r  0.60, P  0.01.
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tions. To this end subjects did not earn their income in cash but had to spend
it on a large but fixed menu of items. We created 2 catalogs with 120 items
including books, CDs, DVDs, sports articles, cosmetics, consumer electronics,
and outdoor equipment. The catalogs were identical with the exception that
all prices were 50% higher in one catalog (high-price condition). The broad
range of goods ensured that our mode of paying subjects did not differ too
much from paying them in cash. Prices in the catalog with the lower prices
(low-price condition) ranged from€5.99 (sun screen) to€89.99 (external hard
drive).
To keep real purchasing power constant between the 2 conditions incomes
were generated in the following way. First, we randomly generated a poten-
tial real income (obtained by the subjects conditional on solving the task
correctly) for each trial in the low-price condition in the interval between€60
and €90. For each income in the low-price condition we constructed a high-
price trial in which income was exactly 50% higher. Note that in the trials for
which prices were 50% higher, incomes were also 50% higher; i.e., real
purchasing power was identical in the low- and high-price conditions, respec-
tively. High- and low-price trials were alternated in blocks of 5 trials each,
whichwere preceded by a screen specifying the purchase catalog that applied
to those trials.
Before subjects entered the scanner they read the instructions for the
experiment and were given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with
the 2 catalogs for 10 min. Then they were asked to answer several control
questions tomake sure that they had understood the difference between the
2 catalogs; e.g., subjects were asked how much an item with price p in the
catalogwith the lower prices would cost in the catalogwith the higher prices.
On leaving the scanner, subjects rolled a dice to determine which trial was
selected for actual payment. Afterward they answered a questionnaire and
made their selection from the catalog with the low or high prices (depending
onwhich trial hadbeen selected). The chosen itemsweremaileddirectly to the
subjects. All shipping costs were borne by the experimenters.
fMRI Data Acquisition. Scanning was performed on a 3-Tesla (T) Trio Scanner
(Siemens), by using a standard 8-channel head coil. Slices were in axial orien-
tation and covered all of the brain including the midbrain but not the entire
cerebellum. Scan parameters were as follows: slice thickness, 2 mm; interslice
gap, 1mm;matrix size, 128 128; field of view, 230 230mm; echo time (TE),
33 ms; repetition time (TR), 2.5 s. The scanning was performed in 2 sessions
with 100 trials each for25min each, resulting in an overall scanning time of
50 min and 1,200 scans.
fMRI Data Preprocessing. fMRI data analysis was performed by using Statistical
Parametric Mapping 5 (SPM5, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For preprocessing,
functional imageswere realigned to the first image of the first session of each
time series and again realigned to the mean image after first realignment.
Images were then slice-timed by using a sync interpolation, normalized to the
canonical EPI template used in SPM5, and smoothed with an 8-mm Gaussian
kernel. After normalization images were resampled to a voxel size of 3 3
3 mm.
fMRI Model 1. The model was estimated in 3 steps. First, for every subject we
estimated a general linear model with autoregressive order 1 [AR(1)] and the
following regressors (R):
(R1) @ work task during high-price condition.
(R2) @ income screen during high-price condition.
(R3)@ income screenduringhigh-price conditionmodulatedbybinned real
income (bin values were 0, 6, 7, and 8, indicating, respectively, incomes of€0,
€60–€70, €70–€80, and €80–€90).
(R4) @ income screen during high-price conditionmodulated by prediction
error for the trial.
(R5) @ work task during low-price condition.
(R6) @ income screen during low-price condition.
(R7) @ income screen during low-price conditionmodulated by binned real
income.
(R8) @ income screen during low-price condition modulated by prediction
error for the trial.
The prediction error in any trial equals the real income for that trial minus
a weighted sum of the real payoffs received in all previous trials,
PEt It Et
Et1 Et   PEt
where PE is prediction error, I is actual income in the given trial, E is expected
income for the trial, and  is the learning factor (which was set at 0.3). All
monetary variables were measured in real values. All of the regressors were
modeled as a boxcar function with a duration equal to that event and were
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response before estimation of the
general linearmodel (GLM).We also included a session constant and 6motion
parameters of no interest.
Second, for each subject we calculated the following first-level contrasts (C):
(C1) @ income screen during the high-price condition minus at income
screen during the low-price condition (R2–R6).
(C2) @ income screen modulated by binned real income in high- minus
low-price trials.
(C3) @ income screen modulated by prediction error in high- minus low-
price trials.
Finally, the estimates on the individual level for each subject were entered
into a second-level random-effects analysis, by using one-sample t tests on the
individual contrast statistics.
The results of these 3 contrasts are depicted in Table S2. The result of
contrast 1 is also depicted in Fig. 2A. Anatomical localizations were then
performedbyoverlaying the tmapsonanaverageanatomical imageandwith
reference to an anatomical atlas.
Fig. 2C uses the value of the contrast R2–R6 as the measure of individual
neural money illusion.
fMRI Model 2. To compute the statistics reported in Fig. 2B we computed a
second GLM with AR(1) and the following regressors:
(R1) @ work task (high price).
(R2) @ income and income  €0 (high price).
(R3) @ income and income  €60–€70 (high price).
(R4) @ income and income  €70–€80 (high price).
(R5) @ income and income  €80–€90 (high price).
(R6) @ work task (low price).
(R7) @ income and income  €0 (low price).
(R8) @ income and income  €60–€70 (low price).
(R9) @ income and income  €70–€80 (low price).
(R10) @ income and income  €80–€90 (low price).
Omitted details for this second analysis were identical to those for the first
model.
The results of this model were used to extract individual beta estimates for
the different income bins at the voxels of peak activation (contrast 1, model
1) for each subjectwithin the region depicted in Fig. 2A. Fig. 2B then plots the
average beta values across subjects for R2–R5 and R7–R10.
Questionnaire Data. Subjects rated the economic advantageousness of a series
of 8 economic scenarios on a scale from 1 (not advantageous at all) to 15 (very
advantageous) within a time limit of 20 s. The exact wording of the question
was as follows: ‘‘Albert buys a house for €200,000. A year later he sells the
house again. In this year inflation was X%—all prices increased by X%.
Albert received Y euros for the house (Z% more than he paid for it). How
advantageous do you think this transaction was? (1, not advantageous at all;
15, very advantageous).’’ The question, taken from ref. 1, contained informa-
tion on (nominal) buying and selling prices for a house and the rate of
inflation. The buying price was the same for all scenarios. Selling price and
inflation varied to imply 4 different percentage levels of real change (2,1,
2, 5). There was a high-inflation and a low-inflation representation for each
level of real change. For example, for a real change of 2%, the parameters
for the question above in the low-inflation representation were X  1, Y 
198,000, and Z1, and in the high-inflation representation they were X
25, Y  154,000, and Z  23.
We constructed a measure of individual money illusion (used in Fig. 2C) by
taking the individual averageof thedifferences in ratings for a particular level
of real change in the high- vs. low-inflation representation.
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